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Although the title of this thesis indicates the scope of the study-
will cover the entire gamut of Bureau management, perusal will reveal a
noticable lack of mention of utilities , transportation, and real estate
management. Omission of these activities, except for brief recognition
of transportation management in Chapter III, is not done with the pur-
pose of slighting these essential functions. Realizing, however, the
necessity of keeping the subject matter within reasonable limits, I
have chosen to emphasize facility management since it is the area of
major management effort.
It must also be noted that the need for and the basic concept of
integrated management within the Bureau of lards and Docks are ideas
that are certainly not original with this writer. Both the need and
the concept have been long recognized within the Bureau organization.
The specific purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to present the frame*
work of a system of facilities management which, it is believed, will
provide a practical and workable solution to these underlying needs.
Subsequent to the completion of this thesis, the Secretary of the
Navy ! s decision concerning realignment of the facility maintenance re-
sponsibilities was published. By this decision, the Bureau of Yards
and Docks will assume management control over all facilities mainte-
nance. It is considered that this realignment of management respon-
sibilities will not invalidate the proposals presented herein, in fact,
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Defense spending will exceed $55.0 billion in the proposed Fiscal
lear 1964 budget. The armed forces have a moral as well as a legal
obligation to the taxpayers to obtain maximum utilization of these
dollars. This is particularly true in the world of today when there
are so many demands on Uncle Sam's bank account.
Included in the responsibilities assigned to the U. S. Navy is
the task of managing the public works, public utilities, real estate,
and construction and transportation equipment within the Naval Shore
Establishment. Management of these facilities exceeds $500 million
per year. In addition, the average appropriation for new construc-
tion during the period Fiscal lear 1959-1963, was approximately $185
million. A management program of this size requires methods and pro-
cedures which will insure, to the greatest extent possible, the max-
imum return on the taxpayer's investment.
Interest in the Navy's facility programs is widespread in the
Congress and in the Executive Branch, The Congressional interest in
military construction is exemplified by the Fiscal Year 1963 appro-
priation hearings in the House of Representatives in which there were
268 pages of testimony in support of $161 million of Navy military
construction funds, compared to 164 pages of testimony for 17.1 bil-
lion of Navy procurement funds. Congressional interest in facility
maintenance is demonstrated by the Fiscal lear 1963 Department of
1
--
2Defense Appropriations Act, the passage of which marked the first tine
that Congress, in appropriating operation and maintenance funds, has spec-
ified the minimum amount available for maintenance of real property facili-
ties.* The Department of Defense, in turn, has expressed a desire to im-
prove the analysis of program requirements in the area of the operations
and maintenance appropriation.^ Within the Navy, the emphasis on facili-
ty management is demonstrated by the Secretary of the Navy's policy of
consolidation of public works activities to achieve more economical and
efficient operations. 3 in addition, a study has just been completed of
increased management effectiveness in the Navy. Although the outcome of
the study is not known, the fact that such an analysis was conducted
serves only to emphasize the other expressed interests in the various fac-
ets of Bureau of Yards and Docks management.
The need for improved management procedures has long been recognized
by the Bureau of lards and Docks, and many steps have been taken in this
direction. An indication of their success was given by the Chief of the
Bureau, who was able to report that despite an increase in the replace-
ment cost of the Shore Establishment (less Marine Corps) from |17.6 bil-
lion to |18.6 billion, maintenance expenditures during Fiscal Year 1962
decreased from $308.7 million to 1307.6 million/ The Bureau has also
been aware for some time of the need for an integrated system of manage-
ment as indicated by a Bureau ax| hoc committee which is currently study-
ing the adoption of this system.
ipublic Law 87-577.
Programming System for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Study
Report . 25 June 1962, p. II--4.
^SSCNAVIKST 5Z.50.9 of 30 June I960.
^"BuDoeks Annual Report," The Maw Civil Engineer . Ill (Nov., 1962} 13.
..
3In view of the widespread interest in Bureau of lards and Docks manage-
ment responsibilities, the time seems especially opportune for an independ-
ent review of the broad aspects of these responsibilities with a view to-




THE INTEGRATED SYSTEMS APPROACH
Prior to the study of actual management situations and systems ap-
plications in the Bureau of lards and Docks organization, it is well to
review the integrated systems approach in general. This review will be
undertaken with a view towards answering the following questions: Fihat
is the integrated systems approach? What is its objective? What is its
significance to management?
James D, Gallagher, a leading specialist in the commercial use of
systems and data processing, defines this approach to management as fol-
lows:
Such a system involves three basic elements. The first is the use
of data-processing equipment involving computers and electronic in-
put -and output devices for the rapid collection, manipulation, and
tabulation of data. The second is the use of highly developed com-
munication links between electronic computers and input-output de-
vices s© that one machine can 'talk' to another, or actually oper-
ate another, within the system. The final—and most important
—
element is the proper selection and arrangement of information for
planning and control so as to form a system of reports which will
give each manager the key facts he needs for decisions, underscoring
especially the exceptions or abnormal situations needing his atten-
tion. If all three elements . • • are present, a good management
information system exists.^-
At this point it is well to note that authorities agree that although
the utilization of electronic computers provides a system more capable
of rapid accumulation and dissemination of information, a computer is
not a mandatory element of management information systems. It can thus
•'•James D. Gallagher, Management Information Systems and the Com-
puter . Research Series Ho. 51, American Management Association "(New lork:
ASIA, 1961), p. 11.

be reemphasized that the most important element is a proper flow of in-
formation to management for decision making.








Each of the components must be present in a viable system; however, feed-
back is perhaps the most important. The essence of the system is its abil«
ity to vary inputs in such a manner that the desired output will be a-
chieved. Information-feedback systems have been present in their bio-
logical form since the beginning of life. In the context of political,
social, and economic systems, information-feedback has been present for
centuries, although perhaps their concept was too vague to be formally
recognized. It was not until the 194-0' s that the formal information-
feedback theory was developed simultaneously, although under differing
circumstances, by Korbert Weiner and Claude Shannon. Following V;orld
War II, key contributions to information theory were published within a
period of a few months, and originated in part from wartiise research on
automatic fire control systems, in the case of Weiner, and on secrecy
codes, in the case of Shannon.1 The schemes thus developed, and as ap-
-'-Robert M. Fano, Transmission of Information: A Statistical Theory
of Communication (New York: The U. I. T. Press and Mley and Sons, 1961),
p. 1.
-
6plied to organization management, have 00123 to be known as integrated
systems management, cybernetic management or information technology.^-
In any case the essential input-throughput-output-feedback-corrector
components are present.
Tfliat is the objective of the systems approach to management? This
can best be answered with one word—integration. Authorities recognize
that business management has tended to become overly specialized. The
manager specializes within his department where his day-to-day experi-
ence only serves to perpetuate the atmosphere of unrelated compartmen-
talization.2 Any management must avoid a parochial point of view, yet
traditional organization systems try to force managers in this direction.
Tilles, a lecturer in business administration and production management,
notes this by stating:
One of the tragedies frequently suffered by people who fall in love
with such traditional organization techniques as job descriptions
and organization eharts is that after a while they become far more
concerned with specialization than with coordination. Somehow the
inevitable result of boxes and lines appears to be the division of
tasks, rather than merely their delineation. As a result, the neat
little lines on the chart, which were originally intended to be
boundaries, always seem to become fences.^
This is not to say that organization charts must become a thing of the
past; however, the management techniques of tomorrow, which are now com-
ing into wide -scale use in government and industry, are forcing subor-
dinate and interrelated organizations to achieve this integrated systems
approach if they are to be responsive to outside influences.
^-Harold J. Leavitt and Thomas L. Whisler, "Management in the 1980' s, n
Harvard Business Review . XXXVI (June, 195£), 41.
Jay I. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (M. I. T. and Hew York: The
M. I. T. Press end John Riley and Sons, Inc., 196l), p. 2.
%eymour Tilles, "The Manager's Job: A System's Approach," Harvard
Business Review . XLI (Jan. -Feb., 1963), 79.

7The systems approach allows management to overcome the compartmental-
ized approach; in fact, it forces management to change. The basis of the
approach to systems analysis and design is to research the entire organi-
sation, beginning with its basic objectives. Systems analysis forces
management to state exactly what is done, and what specific information
is needed. Systems design revises the entire management process and re-
casts it into an integrated whole.
What is the significance of the systems method to management? The
most important and far reaching affect of this approach is its influence
on managers themselves. They must reorient their thinking from the spe-
cialized departmental approach to the conceptual approach. Managers must
develop conceptual skills. They must become aware of their organization
as a whole operation.
Culliton points out that managers must develop the concept of a con-
sumer-oriented organization. Such an approach, however, makes the old
kind of departmentalization untenable. A manufacturing department which
makes only what is cheapest or easiest to make, or an engineering de-
partment which designs only what it likes illustrate a management ap-
proach which cannot survive in the conceptual atmosphere . The whole is
not the sum of a good engineering department, a good production depart-
ment, and good other departments. The whole is the consumer-oriented
business, and it will be more or less healthy as it has parts which, in
their interrelationships with each other, work for or against the whole . 1
Tilles, on the other hand, argues that customer satisfaction is only one
measure of an organization's performance. Other factors which must also
1J. Vs. Culliton, "Thinking Ahead: The Age of Synthesis," Harvard
Business Review , XL (Sept. -Oct., 1962), 4.0.
-
be considered are the labor force (their opportunities and stability of
employment), suppliers (rapidity of payment), creditors (adherence to con-
tract terms), and competitors (rapidity of growth).! In either case it
is apparent that the manager raust develop a broader and much more all in-
clusive attitude.
No rational person would argue that precepts such as these are falla-
cious. Rather, it is surprising that there is such a proliferation of
authoritative writing about this "new" approach to management. It is new
in the sense that the size of big business and big government has caused
many organizations to decentralize to the extent that top management has
become, in many cases, completely isolated from important day-to-day op-
erations while the day-to-day middle managers have tended towards over-
specialization. This top management isolation and middle manager spe-
cialization complement one another in producing an organizational out-
look that can easily become shortsighted in its method of operation.
This writer was associated with an organization where the idea or thought
of compartmentalization was strong enough that on© division, when origi-
nating correspondence for the top executive's signature, would indicate
that the scheme in question was approved or disapproved by Division X
rather than by the overall organization. Although this administrative
practice was soon corrected, one wonders how effective the correction
was in terms of changing human feelings and beliefs. The systems ap-
proach offers management a way out of the mazej however, the approach is
exacting in its demands for a new managerial outlook.
Discussion of the need for conceptual attitudes and the hazards of
overspecialization are points which may fail to impart full appreciation
iTille s , op. cit . , p . 78
.

9of the benefits of the systems approach. What are some aspects of sys-
tems management which are more tangible or perhaps more realistic to the
day-by-day management of the organization? Such benefits come from the
availability of more accurate and more timely information. Lack of suf-
ficient or timely information is a factor which has long plagued managers.
The one extreme was the manager who postponed the final act of decision
in the hope that more and better information would become available.
The other extreme, the manager who jumped to conclusions, is described
by one authority who states:
Faulty practices constituting no more than a kind of 'folklore' • . .
'rules of thumb' and 'quickies' of one sort or another , . • have
abounded in persistent managerial use for no better reason than that
they have produced 'cheap' and 'simple' figures.l
The only reason such decisions are simple is because they fail to face
reality.2 Heality can be faced by the manager who has the information
available when he needs it.
There are, however, those who argue that provision of additional in-
formation is neither necessary nor desired. Their attitude is that things
worked all right for me so why should anyone else in that job need more
information than I did? Samuel H. Alexander, Chief of the Data Process-
ing System Division of the National Bureau of Standards, characterizes
this problem by stating:
We are emerging from a period in ishich much of a firm's data served
as a historical or police function, rather than a managerial function
and entering a period in which they can be made available to assist
management. Therefore, this gray zone of data usage must be approached
and approached effectively. There must be organizational procedures
set up so that it can be discussed without people leaping at each
other's throats and telling one another to mind their own business.
^Ross G, Walker, "The Judgment Factor in Investment Decisions,
"




Tempers run high over such matters. I am myself (at least in theory)
a neutral observer, and I have seen this situation appear repeatedly
in every business activity and government operation I have had a chance
to observe at close range. Conflicting personal opinions and interests
do more to hamstring the (systems) approach than any other factor.
The first reaction to a manager's denial of the need for more and
better information is to say that this type of reasoning is absurd; how-
ever, there are those who are gifted with an uncanny knack of intuitive -
ness that never seems to fail. One wonders, however, how much better use
could be made of this ability if it could only be channeled into those
areas where it would really count. Surely the prospect of having suffi-
cient data available to take the guess work out of what are actually
routine decisions is not something to be cast aside. We are operating
in the nucleonic, electronic, and jet propulsion age, yet our decision
making is in the horse and buggy stage .2
It seems, therefore, that organizations in general, and particularly
the large decentralized types, are suffering from information constipation.
The tremendous growth of most organizations in the past two dece.des has
isolated top management, forced it into a management by exception princi-
ple, and produced a shortsighted middle management philosophy. It would
seem that the only way out of the problem is to provide a freer flow of
information. This, however, is not the case. The problem is not solved
merely by providing more information, or by faster accumulation and trans-
mittal of data, or by wider distribution of previous data, or by holding
more conferences. One of the major fallacies is thinking that such meas-
ures will provide a ready made solution. What is required is the overall
^Samuel H. Alexander, "Integrated Data Processing: A Progress Re-
port/ Administrative Automation Through IDP and EDP . Office Management
Series No. 144, American Management Association (New York: AM, 1956), pp.
2-3.
Kelvin L. Hurni, "Decision Making in the Age of Automation,"
Harvard Business Review f XXX (Sept. -Oct., 1955), 49.
•.
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study of the organization system in its entirety to discover what infor-
mation must be provided at what level f* A system is required which will
integrate the parts into a meaningful whole, which will provide to each
level of management the information which it needs to carry out its as-
signed responsibilities, and which will overtly orient the entire organ-
ization to a common objective.
Important aspects of the systems approach which should not be over-
looked are the management science or operations research techniques.
These methods, which consist of the application of the scientific ap-
proach to operational problems, emphasise the use of conceptual models
for decision-making. Crawford classifies the several types of concep-
tual models according to the type of symbolic tool used (logic models
or mathematical models), according to their function (descriptive models
or policy models, i.e., those designed to provide a basis for evaluating
courses of action), according to the degree of certainty of the variables
(certainty models or probability models), or according to the type of de-
cision to be made (single or multiple).
Of the many business applications of operations research, two areas
of interest ere maintenance and investment. In the field of maintenance
one single -decision policy model seeks to minimize total costs. The total
costs are the variable cost of replacing parts failing in use, the varia-
ble cost of replacing parts used during scheduled maintenance, the cost
of the parts wasted when replaced during maintenance, and fixed costs.
Ihen the first derivative of the equation expressing the relationship
ilbid .. p. 51.
^Robert W. Crawford, "Operations Research and Its Role in Business
Decisions, 15 Selected Readings in Management , ed. Fremont A. Shull, Jr.
(Eomewood, 111. J Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958), p. 141.
•
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between these costs is set equal to zero to minimize total costs, the
time to replace parts then becomes a function of the pattern of part fail-
ure, the variable cost of replacing one part failing in use, the variable
cost of replacing one part during scheduled maintenance, and the cost of
the part per unit time wasted. •*• In the investment problem, the alterna-
tives studied may be the use of the present machine if replacement is
involved, the use of a new machine of one particular type, or the use
of alternative types of machines. The decision may be made on the basis
of analyzing alternative annual costs, returns on the investment, or pay-
out periods,2 Although both examples cited pertain to equipment consid-
erations, the methods are equally applicable to other areas of mainte-
nance and investment.
Although analytical methods, such as those discussed above, provide
considerable assistance to the manager in his decision making role, they
cannot provide the maximum benefit unless properly used. Drucker points
out that if the various management science methods are to help manage-
ment reach its full potential, they must not be allowed to become the
"management gadget bag 1' of techniques for the efficiency expert. Manage-
ment science techniques must concentrate on the performance of the whole
rather than the efficiency of the parts.3 It is thus apparent that op-
erations research, as a part of the management science approach, must
come within the framework of the integrated systems concept. At its best,
operations research is a systematic approach to a whole business consid-
ered as an integrated operation j it is the analysis of the interrelations
^-Ibid., p. H6.
2 lbid ., p. 148.
^Peter F. Drucker, "Thinking Ahead: The Potentials of Management
Science," Harvard Business Review . XZXVII (Jan. -Feb., 1959), 25-26.
•
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of all the business functions. 1
From the foregoing it is apparent that systems management techniques
improve the decision making process in three basic ways: (l) The quanti-
fication of selected data will improve not only the amount of facts in a
specific report dealing with a decision area, it will also improve the in-
formation content. (2) Decision making will be based on evaluation of a
wider range of alternatives and of current factual data rather than on
intuition and the extrapolation of historical data. This will be made
possible through operations and decision simulation. (3) The impact of
a decision in one functional area on another functional area of an or-
ganization will be more easily measured, and, as a result, a more com-
prehensive view of the organization's activities can be taken. This
should lead to decisions which optimize the goals of the total organi-
zation, rather than any particular department or division.^
There are two further questions which should be considered to
determine the full effect of the systems approach on management. The
first of these is management judgment. The second is the effect of sys-
tems management on the organizational structure.
Authorities agree that a definite place remains for management
judgment. The major effect of systems -type management is to facilitate
decision making by giving the manager information which is more timely
and accurate. As Gallagher notes, the decision cannot be an automatic
response to the information input. The manager's judgment, and the re-
sponsibility for the consequences, will not be transferred to the data
processing system, "at least not in the foreseeable future—and never in
Tierbert Solow, "Operations Research in Business," Fortune (Feb.,
1956), p. 146.
Gallagher, op. cit.„ pp. 51-52.

uthe area of top management decision."! The existence of management sci-
ences does not mean there will be automatic management. They do, how-
ever, provide a springboard from which to reach further by the exercise
of managerial intelligence and judgment.^ These facts are true despite
the research work in highly sophisticated computer programs which point
towards the design of programs presumably capable of making judgmental-
type decisions. H. A. Simon, a leading authority in this research effort,
indicates that even though basic discoveries about the nature of human
problem solving seem to point toward a fundamental revolution in the area
of judgmental decision making, "many, perhaps most, of the problems that
have to be handled at the middle and high levels in management have not
been made amenable to mathematical treatment, and probably never will. "3
The question of th© effect of the systems approach on organiza-
tional structure involves consideration of centralization as opposed to
decentralization. Perhaps one of the most widely referenced works is
that of Leavitt and ihisler who make several predictions concerning the
information technology. The information technology should move upward
the boundary between planning and performance. Planning will be taken
from the middle managers and given to such specialists as operations re-
searchers or operations analysts. Middle management jobs will become
highly structuredj they will be governed by operating rules that cover
the day-to-day decision making process. Large organizations will recen-
tralize. Top managers will take on even more of the planning, innovating,
and other "creative" functions. Radical reorganization of the middle
^•Ibid.. p. 56.
^Forrester, op . Pit . . p. 9.
%. A, Simon, The New Science of Management Decision (Hew Xork:
Harper Bros., 1961;, p. 21,
-
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management level will cause certain classes of jobs to move downward be-
cause they require less skill, while others (operations analysts, etc.)
will move up. The line separating top and middle management will be drawn
more clearly and more indelibly than ever before.
Top management is pictured as welcoming with open arms the recen-
tralization tendency because any reduction in the number of middle managers
will mean more economy. This feeling will persist despite the recognition
of such compelling factors as the need to provide a top manager training
ground through decentralization, the need to develop the "whole man", or
to induce more active cooperation. The more information technology can
reduce the number of middle managers, the more top management will want
to try it. The organization of the future is pictured as a football bal-
anced on the top of a bell. The football will contain the top staff or-
ganization who will deal with problems of coordination, individual auton-
omy, group decision making, and so on. Those in the bell will be dealt
with quite differently and will have different means of control and com-
munication. *-
Other authorities predict quite the opposite. Forrester states
that improved definition of objectives and more pertinent standards for
measurement of managerial success will permit managers at the lower levels
to take on more responsibility in a form which can be more effectively
discharged.2 Another viewpoint is that taken by Simon who states:
The question is not whether we shall decentralize, but how far we
shall decentralize . . . Automation of important parts of business
data processing and decision making activity, and the trend toward
a much higher degree of structuring and programming . . . will rad-
ically alter the balance of advantage between centralization and
*-Leavitt and Vihisler, on. cit .» pp. 41-48 •
^Forrester, op. cit .. p. 46.
-
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decentralization . , . new developments in decision making will tend
to induce more centralization in decision making activities at mid-
dle-management levels .1
It would seem, therefore, that the systems approach to management
will not completely banish middle management. If used correctly, it will
bring the middle manager into even closer contact with the more dynamic
and challenging features of the organization. This correct use would
put into the middle manager's hands the information he needs to perform
his tasks, knowing that his individual actions and those of his subordi-
nates will be in line with top management policy. Another factor, which
is just as important, is that it will give the middle manager insight in-
to the overall organizational system so that he may become aware of the
effect of his actions upon other parts of the organization.
It has not been this writer's intention to discuss all of the many
details relative to system management in this chapter, but rather, to
highlight some of the more important considerations behind the integrated
systems movement in management. The basic principle behind this approach
is improved, more realistic, and more rational management. This comes
about through the increased availability of information. This informa-
tion must be accurate, and its flow must be timely and in the quantities
and qualities needed by the various management levels. The flow of in-
formation circulates throughout the organization in such a manner that
it can bring the pieces together into a common whole, thus making the
organization more responsive to outside influence and requirements. It
requires, however, a significant, and in many cases an explicit, change
in managerial philosophy and practice, particularly at the middle manage-
ment level. In the past, the only place in the organization where any
%. A. Simon, op. cit .« pp. 43-4-7.
-
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degree of "wholeness" was felt necessary or where any attempt at coordina-
tion was made was at the top management level. The Integrated systems
approach will provide a new and dynamic challenge to all levels of manage-
ment. As Drucker states:
In dealing with their new tasks, the managers of the I960' s will to
a large extent have to employ the same tools they are using today,
Jut managers tvHI also find, increasingly, that they are expected to
to know, understand, and handle new concepts and tools of management.
Increasingly, they will find that they are expected to use systematic
methods of analysis and decision making, supplemented by new tools of
communication, computation, end presentation.
Executives can safely disregard all the fanciful talk about the com-
puter 'replacing managers' end 'making decisions.' Manager's work,
it can be said with confidence, is going to become more important and
their numbers larger. But the 'management sciences' —such as opera-
tions research or decision making logic—and the new electronic tools
and systems are going to make a difference, even to the manager in
the small business.
And the manager of 1970 will need all the help he can get from such
new concepts and tools. For his job is going to be so complex, so
big, so demanding as to require all the tools of simplification and
systemization that can possibly be obtained. *•
•'-Peter F. Drucker, "The Next Decade in Management, n Dun f s Review
and Modem Industry . IXXIV (Dec, 1959), 61.

CHAPTER III
CURRENT BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS MANAGEMENT
Discussion of the integrated systems approach to Bureau of Yards and
Docks management-*- would be meaningless without considering current manage-
ment practices and information systems. These, in turn, cannot be fully
evaluated without consideration of the organizational framework within which
the Bureau's management take place. The need for this review holds true
today even though the recent Navy-wide management study promises some re-
organization of the Department of the Navy, for any revised or remodeled
Bureau management system should utilize the best of what is available.
Study of the current Navy organizational framework is particularly impor-
tant in the case of Bureau of lards and Docks because the Bureau is con-
cerned with functions which have some of the most widely dispersed assign-
ment of responsibilities of all of the Navy's business activities. 2
The existing organization of the Department of the Navy evidences
^Throughout this thesis any reference to Bureau of Yards and Docks
management is intended to include the management of all levels of the total
Bureau organization, i.e., the Bureau of Ysrds and Docks, the Bureau's
field engineering offices, and the Civil Engineer Corps managed Public
storks Departments at the various Naval activities,
business activities are meant to include those portions of "logis-
tics administration and control 1 ' which deal with the acquisition, mainte-
nance, and disposal of facilities and installations, and the equipment
pertaining thereto; and those portions of the "business administration"
tasks of the Navy which deal with the administrative procedures concern-
ing facilities and installations, and the budgeting and expenditure of
funds pertaining thereto, (Department of the Navy, General Order No. 5 >




the bilinear concept of coutrol over the shore establishment. The Chief
of Naval Operations is responsible for the "Naval command" of the Depart-
ment of the Navy, except for those areas where command functions within
the "Naval command" task rest with the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The Chief of Naval Operations responsibility carries into the area of
planning, forecasting, and determining requirements j coordinating and
directing the efforts of the various bureaus and offices as necessary
to effectuate the availability and distribution of these requirements
j
and issuing statements of Operation Force requirements, in terms of what
is needed, where it is needed and when it is needed, to the bureaus and
offices of the Navy Department, and through them to the Shore Establish-
ment.
The Navy technical assistants (Bureau Chiefs) are responsible for
immediate supervision of their own organizations including;
a. The planning and translation of approved requirements into
firm procurement schedules.
b. The research in, and the development, procurement, produc-
tion, utilization and distribution of equipment, material, and facilities.
c. The procurement, training, administration, assignment and
utilization of personnel.
d. The operation and management of all activities assigned to
them.
e. The sound and legal expenditure of funds appropriated for
performance of their work, including preparation of estimates for funds
required to carry out approved plans and directives.
f . Acting as technical advisers ana assistants to the Secre-
tary of the Navy, the Civilian Executive Assistants, the Chief of Naval
Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the formulation of
.
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policies and procedures governing the administration of the Department of
the Navy.-*-
Administration of the shore activities of the Navy is divided into
the functions of military command and management control. Military com-
mand, exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations, is concerned with the
military operation and military administration of shore activities.
Management control constitutes:
Complete management ... of the performance of the work of shore ac-
tivities .... the exercise of executive authority and responsibilty
for the performance of the mission, tasks, and work of shore activi-
ties .... (including) mission planning, shore activity development,
workload planning, internal organization and procedures, budgeting,
accounting, staffing, and the utilization of personnel, funds, mate-
rials, and facilities. Management control also includes responsibilty
for appropriate coordination and application of technical direction.
This technical direction is the specialized or professional service .
... by bureaus and offices ... in accordance with their assigned
missions .... Assignment of responsibilities for technical direc-
tion to bureaus and offices, other than those exercising management
control, will be made only when it is determined by the Secretary of
the Navy to be in the best interest of the total organization to a-
chieve coordination or more efficient performance . . . 2
This dichotomous situation of management and technical control
presents a perplexing organizational concept. In those instances where
both types of control are vested in the same Bureau, there is no problem.
Such is not the case, however, when these control features are divided
between different Bureaus at any one activity. This leads to the situ-
ation where the Bureau having management responsibility exercise the only
real measure of control since that bureau controls the activity's funds.
On the other hand, the technical bureau has responsibility for performing
a particular function at the activity, but is nevertheless subject to the
"appropriate coordination and application"^ aspects of the management
•'-Ibid., pp. 4-6.




control bureau. In short, the favorable outcome of technical control ef-
forts depends to a major degree on implementation by others.
Concerning the role of the Bureau of Yards and Docks in Shore Estab-
lishment Management, the Bureau, except as otherwise prescribed, is respon-
sible for planning, development, procurement, construction, alteration, cost
estimates, and inspection at all shore activities of public work's, public
utilities, construction, transportation, and weight handling equipment.
The Bureau is also responsible for acquisition and disposal of real estate,
and the exercise of management control over Navy housing. In addition, the
Bureau exercises technical direction of all housing, and the repair and up-
keep of public works, public utilities, construction, transportation, and
weight handling equipment, and the operating standards and procedures per-
taining thereto.!
For the performance of its assigned tasks, the concept of Bureau or-
ganization is one of central direction through decentralized management.
The Bureau of lards and Docks exercises management control over 35 activ-
ities including Field Engineering Offices (Field Divisions, District Public
Works Offices, Area Public Works Offices and Offices in Charge of Construc-
tion) and Field Activities (Public Works Centers, Public Works Transporta-
tion Centers, and others). The Bureau has technical control, within its
assigned area, over all of the Naval commands within the Shore Establish-
ment.
The Bureau's management tasks are broken down into the functional areas
of planning, design, construction, maintenance, and budgeting. It is, how-
ever, noted that the only budgeting activity carried on by the field engi-




neering offices is in connection with its own internal administration. 1 Ac-
cordingly, in support of the major management functions, the Bureau's manage-
ment responsibilities are performed through three basic systems: Planning,
Military Construction, and Public Works. The general characteristics of each
are as follows:
I. The Planning System
The Bureau's major responsibilities in the planning area are in
support of the Navy Shore Facilities Planning and Programming System. As
a management bureau, the Bureau is responsible for initiation of valid fa-
cility requirements for those activities under its management control; how-
ever, the major planning responsibilities of the Bureau of Yards and Docks
are in the area of the technical services it performs for other bureaus and
for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
There are three ways in which the Bureau provides this techni-
cal assistance. The first is the engineering evaluation of existing assets
which the Bureau performs at each Naval activity. The second is the tech-
nical assistance provided by the field engineering office to the Naval Dis-
trict Commandant in connection with the coordination of multiple activity
facilities planning. The third is the technical assistance, including en-
gineering comments, which the Bureau provides to the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations relative to the preparation and issue of the Military Con-
struction Component of the Navy's Effective Program Projections.
•^Budgets for housing activities ars reviewed and commented on by the
field engineering offices.
^The Military Construction Component of the Navy's Effective Program
Projections contains the military construction programs that are being ex-
ecuted through and including the current fiscal year as well as those for
the budget fiscal year and the ensuing four fiscal years. In addition, it
also contains requirements that have not been programmed (OPNAV INSTRUCTION




Of these three types of planning assistance, perhaps the most
significant is the evaluation of existing assets. This process consists of
an engineering analysis of fixed assets at each Naval activity to determine
the best method of satisfying any deficiencies, and, if construction is re-
quired, the conduct of engineering studies necessary to determine the scope
of required construction, rehabilitation or modernization.
The analysis is conducted by a team of engineers from the plan-
ning and maintenance divisions of the cognizant Bureau field engineering
office. This team utilizes such information as may be available, including
maintenance cost records and maintenance and inspection records. The actual
survey includes the determination of substandard assets, whether a particu-
lar facility should be razed or repaired, and the expected remaining life
of the facility after repairs. When construction is determined to be ii&e~
essary, the team furnishes line item scope and engineering data to the
activity Commanding Officer. The results of the survey are subject to the
Commanding Officer's concurrence, or resolution at a higher level (Bureau
or Chief of Naval Operations) where necessary.
^
II The Military Construction System
The Bureau's responsibilities for the design and construction
of all facilities for the Shore Establishment are carried out in three 3teps.
The first occurs during the preparation of preliminary engineering studies
for the various military construction line items. These studies indicate
the exact scope, the detailed cost estimate, and the specifications for
each line item. The second step is the preparation of construction draw-
ings and specifications for each line item, and the third step is the
1grocedures for Planning Naval Shore Activities. NAVDOCKS P-340,
(IS April 1961), pp. 19-29.
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construction of each facility. The Bureau's field engineering offices are
directly responsible for each of these steps. Engineering work performed
during the first two stages is carried out either by the design division of
the field engineering office or by an architect-engineer under a contract
administered by the field office. Construction is performed by contract
except in those few instances where government forces do the work. Overall
management of these three steps at the field office level is through a sys-
tem which monitors the scope and the cost of each line item, and reports de-
viations as well as the progress of design and construction to the Bureau.
Significant deviations in item scope or cost require Bureau approval or fur-
ther Bureau action at the Departmental level.
Ill The Public Works System
This system is composed of three segments: Maintenance, Trans-
portation and Public Works Cost Control. General details of each segment
are a3 follows:
A, The Maintenance Segment . The basic objectives of this
segment are threefold: To raise facility maintenance to a proper level, to
increase the productivity of the maintenance work force, and to achieve
savings in maintenance and utilities operation. To gain these objectives
a process of continuous facility inspection, planning and estimating, shop
scheduling, and reporting is utilized. The purpose of this approach is to
perform facility maintenance on a scheduled basis thereby achieving more
satisfactory maintenance, and controlled operation of the maintenance and
utility services. Management reports provided by this segment are:
1. Expenditure analysis by work center (carpentry,
electrical, etc.) showing material and labor costs both estimated and actual.
The labor costs are further broken down to indicate those based on use of
.
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engineering performance standards (EPS) and those based on non-5P3 estimates.
This report is prepared by all Naval activities and Public Works Centers.
2. Labor analysis indicating the labor used on stand-
ing job orders, on specific job orders, and on minor work authorization.
Every Naval activity prepares this report by work centers. Public Works Cen-
ters prepare two labor analysis reports: One by work center, and one for each
Naval activity being furnished maintenance and utility services.
3. Work center backlog broken down into the various
job order classifications and showing total dollar value of backlog work.
This report is prepared by Naval activities and by Public Works Centers.
Labor analysis reports prepared by each activity are re-
tained by the Public Works Officer for local use; expenditure analysis and
backlog reports are forwarded monthly to the Bureau field engineering office.
The field office reviews the reports and forwards comments to the Naval ac-
tivity concerned. Reports originated by the Public Works Centers are for-
warded month!:/ to the Bureau of Yards and Docks and to the regional Bureau
field engineering office. On the basis of monthly activity reports, the
Bureau field engineering offices submit semiannual reports to the Bureau for
all activities under their jurisdiction which have over 30 personnel in their
combined maintenance and utility divisions. In general, this report indicates
total public works expenditures including a breakdown of productive and over-
head work, comparison of actual performance with that estimated, total work
backlog, and comments concerning significant variances. The Bureau consoli-
dates this information and forwards it to the respective management bureaus
for their information.!
^Maintenance Management of Public Works and Public Utilities
,
(in-
cluding change No. 1, Feb.", 1962), October, 1961, NAVD0CK3 P-321.
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B. The Transportation Segment . This portion is concerned with
the operation, utilization, and luaintenance of transportation and construc-
tion equipment. Each Kaval activity forwards to the Bureau a semiannual re-
port showing vehicle utilization and indicating vehicles in excess or in
short supply. Consolidated reports are prepared by each Bureau field office
for the area under their cognizance. This reporting procedure provides for
analysis of equipment utilization compared to standard utilization factors.
There is also an annual report of maintenance and operations cost for each
type of equipment as well as an annual report of maintenance manpower and
cost analysis which highlights those instances where maintenance labor ex-
ceeds the standard input.
From these data the Bureau is able to review the Navy-wide allo-
cation and assignment of vehicles, the effectiveness of the transportation
maintenance program, and, through the use of standard life expectancy and
economic replacement tables, to forecast future new equipment requirements . •*-
C. The Public Works Cost Control Segment. Initially the pur-
pose of this program was to integrate the budget, engineering, accounting,
and management functions of maintenance into a single system. The initial
effort was made in July, 1959, when the Bureau, in collaboration with the
Comptroller of the Navy, received cost data for selected existing cost clas-
sifications. This information, which was sorted and compiled by the Bureau's
computer installation at Port fiueneme, California, formed the basis of a ten-
tative reporting system for Fiscal Year I960. It was soon apparent, however,
that revised Navy cost classifications were required in the public works area
of accounts if any meaningful results were to be obtained. This was accom-
plished through the issue of additional public works cost accounts by the
^•Management of Transportation Equipment (Sept., 1962) NAVDOCKS P-300.
•'
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Comptroller of the Navy in March, I960. 1
The objective of this cost collection process was to arrive
at functional norms for maintenance. In this respect, it was recognized
that such norms would be affected by many factors such as wage rates, type
of construction, facility condition, size, and others. The ultimate goal
was to establish a direct relationship between the maintenance cost history
and maintenance budgets. 2 This system of cost collection and analysis was
coupled with a drive towards improved maintenance procedures through the
Controlled Maintenance Program as well as more effective consolidated main-
tenance in those areas where Public Works Centers were approved.
Eased on the I960 expenditure accounts, Navy-wide Public
Works cost data were accumulated for Fiscal Years 1961 and 1962. This in-
formation included direct labor, material, and overhead costs in the areas
of transportation operation and maintenance, real property maintenance and
repair, utility operations, and other miscellaneous operations and services.
The most extensive coverage was in the area of real property maintenance
and repair where costs were collected for over A50 expenditure accounts.
The number of accounts was, however, reduced to 130 prior to Fiscal Year
1963 (Appendix A) since the Comptroller of the Ilavy determined that the
larger number was imposing too much of a workload on the individual activ-
ities. In either event there are several noteworthy points. The costs
collected are onl^j for each major type of facility, i.e., barracks building
permanent, barracks building nonpermanent, etc. The permanent and nonper-
•^•Processingy Reporting and Analysis of Public Works Cost Data; In-
terim Operating Handbook (June I960). NAYDOCKS T-3U* P. 1-2.
^U. 3. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Defense
Appropriations, Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962 .
87th. Cong,, 1st. Sess,, Part 2, Operations and Maintenance, pp. 4-10-4-12.
'.
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manent catagories are so general that they offer no real means of correlating
the data with the specific type of construction. Furthermore, there is no
means of accounting for facility age. These factors present significant
limitations to the current public works cost collection system.
Within these limitations, cost control reports are prepared by the
Port Rueneme computer installation based on data received from field activi-
ties and the Navy Regional Finance Offices. These reports are:
1. Quarterly reports of direct labor, material and over-
head costs of transportation, utility, and maintenance operations on a Navy-
wide basis summarized by management bureaus and by Naval Districts. Annual
reports are prepared for each Naval activity.
2. Annual detailed listings of real property inventory and
maintenance cost data for each type of facility shown in Appendix A . This
information is summarized on a Navy-wide basis as well as by management
bureaus. Significant data shown are unit maintenance costs, and total main-
tenance costs as a percentage or original cost-*- and replacement cost.
3. Annual listings of expenditures by expenditure account
numbers.
4-. Annual frequency distribution analyses of maintenance
costs for each facility type at U. S. and non-U. S. activities.
5. Annual backlog of essential maintenance of facilities,
summarized to show the backlog for each activity under the various manage-
ment bureau's cognizance.
2
In summary, the Public Works Cost Control Segment represents the
•'•Original cost is of little sigrd.ficance, due to inflation.
^Processing, Reporting and Analysis, of Public Works Cost Data:
Operating Handbook (Oct., 1961), with changes 1-5, NAVD0CKS~P-3U.
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beginning of a system of integrated Public Works management. To date a con-
siderable amount of data has been collected. The Bureau's analysis of these
data indicates that significant differences in maintenance costs between ac-
tivities cannot be attributed to wage rates or apparently to location. Re-
garding type of construction, there appears to be no direct correlation
between type (permanent and nonpermanent) and maintenance costs, since main-
tenance costs for permanent facilities are higher in some instances than for
nonpermanent. One opinion advanced is that station Commanding Officers are
desirous of upholding standards in permanent facilities, and will therefore
want to spend more maintenance funds on the permanent buildings rather than
on the nonpermanent one. It should be noted again, however, that this cost
collection system does not reflect the specific types of construction nor
does it account for facility age. In addition, another significant factor
which has also been recognized by the Bureau, is that this system shows only
what was done. There is no way of telling how much maintenance work should
ha"ve been done. For these reasons the Bureau recognizes that the present cost
reporting system is really not much more than an accumulation of cost data,
and that it falls far short of the original objective of relating cost his-
tory to budgets.
The foregoing discussion of the Planning, Military Construction and
Public Works Systems has been a general review of the major elements of the
existing management and information systems within the Bureau. In summary,
it is evident that current Bureau of Yards and Docks management is based pri-
marily on furnishing technical services to the Shore Establishment of the
Navy. As a consequence, while Bureau management must be responsive to Shore
Establishment needs, the fruits of much of this management effort depend on
its acceptance by the Shore Establishment. In the performance of its tech-
-
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nical responsibilities the Bureau relies on three basic systems. Two of
these systems, Planning and Military Construction, are related in general to
the Navy's needs for additional or more modern and up-to-date facilities.
The Public Works System, on the other hand, is related to the de.y-by-day op-
eration and maintenance of the Naval Shore Establishment.
The Planning System, which is an outgrowth of the Bureau's participa-
tion in the Naval Shore Facilities Planning and Programming System, affords
the Bureau the opportunity to provide technical assistance at the activity
level and at the departmental level. Through this technical assistance, and
particularly through the process of evaluating facility deficiencies, the
Bureau has achieved a measure of integration between the planning and main-
tenance functions.
Through the Military Construction System there is a degree of integra-
tion between the engineering and construction functions. Ferhaps the
greatest measure of integration in the field engineering offices comes in
those instances where the design and construction divisions are under a
single bead.
The Public Works System, although divided into three segments or sub-
systems, seems to promise a reasonably high degree of public works integration
through the Public Works Cost Control reports. In the case of facilities
maintenance, however, there are major stumbling blocks in the way of achiev-
ing the ultimate objective of relating budgets for future maintenance
operations to past history. The problem of establishing the functional norms
revolves about the fundamental economic and physical problem of how to col-
lect meaningful raw data.
:
CHAPTER IV
AN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The fundamental and basic step in any integrated management system is
to set forth the objectives of the system. Since the Bureau of Yards and
Docks is a part of the Naval Shore Establishment, the ultimate objective of
any of the Bureau's management functions is to provide support for the oper-
ating forces. This is true for any part of the Naval Shore Establishment;
however, in terms of everyday business activity, such an objective is too
remote. For day-to-day management of a Public Works Department work center,
or the Design Division of a Bureau field office, or, for that matter, of the
Bureau itself, it seems that a more tangible objective must be set.
It would seem that such an objective should be related to resources,
for that is what is being managed. Men, money, and material are significant
to anyone, from the Chief of the Bureau down to the most junior man in the
organization. The significant factor, however, is how these resources are
being used. It seems reasonable to say that resources should be used in such
a way as to bring the maximum overall gain to the "corporate owners"—the tax-
payers. The objective of the Bureau's integrated management system is there-
fore considered to be the maximum utilization of resources.
To relate this objective to an integrated management system for the
Bureau of Yards and Docks, there are four basic points to consider: (1) The
major management functions, (2) the relationship of the total system objective
to these management functions, (3) measurement of the system objective in




management Information needed at the various Bureau levels (Departmental,
Field Engineering Office, and Station Public Works Department).
The major management functions are planning, design, construction,
maintenance, and budgeting. The relationship of maximum resource utilization
to each of these functions highlights the following basic considerations: (1)
planning should insure the selection of alternatives which best meet the
specific overall needs of the Navy; (2) design should insure a facility which
satisfies the parameters set during the planning stage, but which will also
recognize the dynamic nature of the Navy; it must also provide for effective
utilization of engineering manpower; (3) construction should insure quality
and financial control as well as timely beneficial occupancy by the govern-
ment; {U) maintenance should insure economy and efficiency of operations,
and the accumulation of critical data for management decision making; (5)
budgeting should insure the use of proper job planning and control.
A major problem is that of achieving each of these functional objectives
in a practical and workable manner. Analysis of the several functional ob-
jectives leads to the following five basic points:
I. Planning . The objectives of Navy planning are to determine require-
ments, including an evaluation of the life of the requirements, and the most
cost effective way of fulfilling them. Determination of facility require-
ments is the line operator's prerog* -re, and the Bureau plays no part in
this operation. An evaluation of the life of the requirement is also a line
function; however, in this instance the Bureau is able to provide valuable
engineering assistance. It i3, however, believed that such assistance should
be in more depth than is now the case.
Determination of construction requirements must consider all of
the facts. In any planning situation the planner is confronted with two
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basic considerations: khat is the duration of the requirement, and what are
the future costs of the various investment alternatives. The first point is
concerned with the fact that too often where is a lack of specific attention
given to the duration of a particular facility requirement. As a result, the
tendency is to propose a facility which has a high degree of permanency and
which minimizes maintenance costs. Although there will be times when this
solution provides the best answer, it is nevertheless considered that there
should be a more objective means of analyzing each planning situation to de-
termine the best method of fulfilling the requirement. To accomplish this
it is believed that the only method which will give a true picture, and at
the same time be responsive to both the duration of requirement and the fu-
ture cost considerations, is one based on the comparison of the lifetime
costs of the investment alternatives. This will furnish a means of assessing
the full effects of the decision by providing an opportunity to analyze many
specific issues. Not only will it consider first cost and projected main-
tenance costs, but it will also demonstrate the effects of accepting a fa-
cility with a shorter lifetime. In short, it is believed that this method
of planning analysis will give a truer picture of how the Navy's long-run
facility requirements can best be met.
The analysis of these various points leads to several considerations.
In any instance of facility planning there are two basic situations. Either
a new facility is required to meet a totally new requirement, or there is
need to repair or replace an existing facility. To properly analyze the
first planning situation where a new facility is required, it is necessary to
consider the alternatives of a facility with a high initial cost and low
maintenance as opposed to one with low initial cost and higher maintenance.
To accomplish this objective it is proposed that two lifetime cost estimates
-
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be provided for each new construction situation, one for a facility with a
15 year life to replacement and a second for a facility with a 25 year life
to replacement.^- In this respect one factor becomes immediately apparent.
It is necessary to arrive at oooe definition of 15 and 25 year construction.
This would ordinarily entail detailed study of many types of building mate-
rials to arrive at specific combinations which would give economic lives of
15 and 25 years. At this point, however, this is not necessary since the
objective of this paper is simply tc focus attention on the fact that there
is more than one way of fulfilling a facility requirement when economic life
is the main consideration. Suffice- it to say, therefore, that 15 year con-
struction for a building would be equated with wood or light ste^l frame,
dry wall interior, composition siding and 15 year built-up roofing. The
25 year alternative would be masonry, reinforced concrete, or heavier steel
frame with precast concrete exterior walls, metal lath and plaster interior
partitions, and 20 year built-up roofing.
Considering these alternatives and the fact that lifetime costs
are involved, it also becomes apparent that such s method of analysis re-
quires the projection of costs 25 years into the future. This is a difficult
task; however, it is equally apparent that these costs cannot be ignored.
They are factors which must play their part in the investment decision, and
which the specific method of investment analysis must recornize.
In the second planning situation, where the alternatives are either
to repair or to replace an existing facility, it is also necessary to consider
all the facts. Facility replacement ie a matter of economic choice, yet too
-^It must of course be recognized that design criteria will limit eco-
nomic choice in the case of certain facilities. An example is the criteria
for aircreft pavement which must conform to standards for tire pressure and
wheel loading. This is not to say, however, that such criteria should not
be subjected to the closest possible scrutiny.
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often the justification for replacement funding hinges on the statement that
the proposed new facility is a sound proposition because it will eliminate
excessive maintenance cost3. Excessive maintenance costs are difficult if
not impossible to define within the present state of the art. Furthermore,
such statements invite rebuttal because they cannot be supported with facts.
As in the instance of the new construction situation, if lifetime cost esti-
mates are prepared for the repair-replacement alternatives, it is considered
that an objective means will be provided for the analysis of exact and spe-
cific requirements, both immediate and long-run.
If these principles can be accepted as valid, it would appear that
the remaining question is how to analyze the various alternatives in the dif-
ferent planning situations. The method selected must be one which not only
accounts for first cost and projected maintenance costs, but which also ful-
fills two essential objectives. It must be directly related to the overall
system objective of maximum resource utilization, and it must account for the
uncertainty which is inherent in predicting long-run requirements and cost
savings.
To fulfill the objective of maximum resource utilization, it is
essential for the planning studies to incorporate a yardstick or standard
against which the variables can be measured. Selecting such a standard could
prove to be a major problem in itself; however, it is considered that much of
the difficulty can be overcome by borrowing a page from the commercial busi-
nessman's handbook. The analysis of commercial investments in fixed assets
is invariably made on the basis of the financial return which may be expected
from the proposed investment. This provides for the businessman the all im-
portant measure of potential profit. Although the government is not in busi-
ness to make a profit, it is most certainly obligated to carry out its business
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operations at the least cost to the taxpayers. Considering this fact, it
would seem logical for alternative facility investments to be assessed
against their respective abilities to generate enough savings to represent
a reasonable return on the taxpayer's investment. Unlike the businessman
who is measuring the return he expects to gain from increased profit due to
expanded production facilities, the government must measure the return which
comes from the lifetime savings that may be expected from one type of fired
asset investment as opposed to the alternative.
Measuring the financial return on the investment is considered an
entirely acceptable approach to the management of the government's business
activities. It is agreed that such a premise may not be altogether accept-
able in the case of weapons system analysis since the only real payoff comes
in the system's ability to deter or defeat the enemy. This, however, is not
the case in the business sector of the government economy, and particularly
when it comes to management's accounting for its business stewardship. In
fact, it is considered that a rate of return analysis is the only appropri-
ate measure of the effective basiness utilization of the resources which the
taxpayer must provide.
Considering this issue as settled, it is necessary to determine an
acceptable rate of return. In the business world the minimum satisfactory
return is the cost of borrowed capital. Since the government is also in the
business of borrowing and lending money, it is considered that the same ap-
proach would provide an economically sound basis for the analysis of govern-
ment investments in fixed assets. It is therefore proposed that the govern-
ment's cost of borrowed capital—in the order of 3% annually—be considered
as an acceptable rate of return when measuring potential savings from
*
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alternative facility investments. 1
The point remaining then is to account for the uncertainty in-
volved in long-run projections of requirements and savings. Here again a
comparison may be drawn with the commercial business community. Commercial
analysis of capital investments recognizes the uncertainty which is inherent
in predicting future cost savings as well as the fact that requirements
themselves cannot be projected into the future without some risk. Because
of these factors, the astute businessman knows that it is not realistic to
enter into an investment situation on the basis that future cost savings,
weighted the same as present-day dollars, will counterbalance high initial
costs. If nothing else, it is apparent that the cost of borrowed capital
tends to reduce the value of future sayings, and this is accounted for in
the selection of an appropriate rate of return. It is, however, necessary
to add an additional factor to account for uncertainty. What seems to be
a firm requirement today may not exist in 15 years. Furthermore, although
projected cost savings may seam reasonable, there is always the chance that
they may be less than expected, or that they may not be realized at all.
Consequently, commercial analysis of capital investments recognizes the need
to discount future cost savings in order to account for risk and uncertainty,
and to allow for the expected return on the capital investment.
Authorities agree that discounting' alternative military projects
is done for the 3ame reason as in the private economy. In the specific case
of facilities there is always the likelihood that assets planned for today
may not be required 15 or 25 years from now. Furthermore, the difficulty of
predicting the maintenance cost savings of one alternative over the other
•*-cf. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in




also makes it essential to discount the future. Considering each of these
factors, there appears to he no logical reason for not discounting the fu-
ture when considering alternative facility investments. Failure to do so
simply overlooks factors which may invalidate the entire situation.
Choosing an acceptable discount rate presents the problem of eval-
uating all the factors involved. How much is an error in prediction worth;
what will be the effect of uncertainty? It must surely be recognized that
facility investments do not usually involve excessively large sums of money.
The risk is obviously not the same as for a multi-billion dollar weapon sys-
tem. Furthermore, many facilities can be designed to serve varying purposes
which again reduces the risk of a waning requirement, and tends to mitigate
the effects of uncertainty. Considering these factors, it is proposed that
the total discount (return on investment plus risk) be in the order of 6%
which will allow 3% for return and about 3% for risk.-*-
To illustrate the foregoing points, a typical facility investment
situation will be analyzed at a 6% discount rate.^ The situation proposed
will be one involving the proposed replacement of an existing 300 foot tim-
ber wharf.-5 The alternatives available to the planner are:
A. Alternative No. 1 .
A new reinforced concrete wharf, 800 feet in length,
with initial cost estimated to be £1,200,000. It is assumed that this
""There may be those who would argue that a 3% discount for risk is ex-
cessive. This may be so; perhaps 2% would be better. It is not the writ-
er's intention to argue this matter, however, since the only important item
at this point is to "sell" a management principle.
*For example and explanation of discount method sea Appendix B.





wharf would have a 25 year life with no substantial salvage value,-*- It is
further assumed that no maintenance will be reouired during the first 5
years, $1,000 per year will be required from 6 to 10 years inclusive,
#2,000 per year for 11 to 15 years inclusive, and $U,000 per year for 16
to 25 years inclusive.
B. Alternative No. 2.
Major repairs to the existing 300 foot timber wharf
would be extensive. The cost of the repairs is estimated to be £-700,000,
which will provide a facility having 15 year life with no salvage value.
Assumed maintenance costs for this wharf are $2,000 per year during the
first five years, |6,000 per year for 6 to 10 years inclusive, and $10,000
psr year for 11 tc 15 years inclusive.
Through the use of a 6% discount rate, the present worth of the
various cash flows for each of the alternatives can be computed. Deter-
mining the present worth of the cash flows will make the two alternatives
directly comparable 3ince it is possible to compute a single amount of money
for each alternative which is equivalent to each of the two series of cash
flows, and which is stated in terms of more realistic present-day dollars.
This computation would give the planner a significant item of information
which could be used with other factors to arrive at a final decision.
Present worth computations for the two alternatives are shown in
Figures 2 and 3. Alternative No. 1, the replacement wharf, shows a present
worth of $1,570,000 compared to about §1,272,000 for the second alternative.
It is apparent that the better choice is to repair the existing wharf. At
the same time it is interesting to note that if future costs were not dis-
counted, the comparative lifetime costs (based on 75 years equivalent life)
-^Any expected salvage value must also be discounted.
1
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of the two alternatives would be $3,765,000 for replacement and $3,950,000
for repairs. Thus, without discounting, the planner has all the ammunition
he needs to make the wrong decision. Instead of extending some benefit to
the taxpayers in the way of a positive gain on their investment, he would
actually be penalizing them; instead of recognizing the risks and uncertain-
ties present in forecasting, he would be blindly ignoring them. Besides
these important factors, there is another significant point to be gained
from sample calculations—although maintenance costs are a factor which must
be considered in any facility investment situation, they do not play a sig-
nificant part over a long period of time since they are so heavily dis-
counted in later years.l
Yr. from Capital Annual Present Worth Present Worth Present Worth
Install . Outlays Maint. Factor Uniform Factor Single of Cash Flows
Date Incurred Costs Payment Series Payment (6)=(2)(5)




$1,200,000 — — — $1,200,000
£1,000 4.212 .7473 3,336
11-15 2,000 4.212 .5584 4,704
16-25 4,000 7.360 .4173 12,285
1st Replacement
25 $1,200,000 — — .2330 279,600
26-30 ~ — — —
.
31-35 1,000 4.212 ,1741 733
36-40 2,000 4.212 .1301 1,095
U-50 4,000 7.360 .0972 2,862
2nd Replacement
50 $1,200,000 — — .0543 65,160
51-55 — — -- —
56-60 1,000 4.212 .0406 171
61-65 2,000 4.212 .0303 255
66-75 4,000 7.360 .0227 668
Total Present Worth $1,570,869
Notes To make the alternatives, which have different economic lives, direct-
ly comparable, it is necessary to use the least common multiple, 75 years.
Figure 2. Alternative No. 1. Present Worth Replacement Wharf.
l-This principle would apply until the discount rate becomes very small,
•.
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Yr. from Capital Annual Present Worth Present Worth Present Worth
Install Outlays Maint. Factor Uniform Factor Single of Cash Flows
Date Incurred Costs Payment Series Payment (6)=(2)(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=<
Repair Costs
1700,000 — — — < 700,000
1-5 $2,000 4.212 ~ 8,424
6-10 6,000 4.212 .7473 18,886
11-15
1st Repair
10,000 4.212 .5534 23,520
15 #700,000 ~ — .4173 292,110
16-20 2,000 4.212 .4173 3,540
21-25 6,000 4.212 .3118 7,880
26-30
2nd Repair
10,000 4.212 .2330 9,814
30 $700,000 — —
.
.1741 121,870
31-35 2,000 4.212 .1741 1,477
36-40 6,000 4.212 .1301 3,288
41-45
3rd Repair
10,000 4.212 .0972 4,094
45 | 700,000 — — .0727 50,890
46-50 2,000 4.212 .0727 617
51-55 6,000 4.212 .0543 1,372
56-60
4th Repair
10,000 4.212 .0406 1,710
60 1700,000 — — .0303 21,210
61-65 2,000 4.212 .0303 257
66-70 6,000 4.212 .0227 564
71-75 10,000 4.212 .0169 712
Total Present Worth ^1, 272,135
Note: To make the alternatives, which have different economic lives, direct-
ly comparable, it is necessary to use the least common multiple, 75 years.
Figure 3. Alternative No. 2. Present Worth of Repaired Wharf
The values of discount calculations to the planner are apparent.
No longer is the planner faced with trying to make a guesswork comparison of
unlike objects since they have been converted to the 3ame present-day dollar
base. No longer must the planner make decisions based on half the informa-
tion; it is now possible to assess the total lifetime cost of each alterna-
tive in a realistic manner. It is also readily possible to see the effect
of accepting a facility with a lower first cost and higher maintenance costs.




facilities offers the planner everything he needs to make a completely real-
istic and objective decision.
Possible gains to the Bureau and to the Navy from this approach to
facility planning are many. From the standpoint of the Bureau of lards and
Docks this method of planning analysis offers a means for achieving more
meaningful integration between planning, design and maintenance since each
of these functions plays a vital part in the investment analysis. Design
and maintenance engineers must provide estimates of first cost and mainte-
nance costs respectively. Both must collaborate in deciding what type of
construction would best be used to attain a particular economic life. The
planning engineer, in turn, should coordinate the overall analysis and be
responsible for preparing final recommendations.
There is, however, more to be gained from this method. Analysis
of individual situations should be prepared by the Bureau's field engineer-
ing offices and forwarded to the Bureau. A summary of these analyses should
then be compiled and forwarded by the Bureau to the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, It is considered that the availability of such informa-
tion would provide a significant adjunct to the Navy's shore facility plan-
ning system since it would permit high-level review of specific requirements,
their duration, and their cost-effective relationships. The area of facil-
ity requirements is one portion of the budget where an effective system of
inter-Havy economic analysis would be beneficial. It would be possible not
only to make trade-offs between new construction projects or between repair-
replacement alternatives, but also between the two. To achieve the best
possible solution to the Navy's chronic problem of too many facility require-
ments but too few dollars, there must be a means for objectively analyzing




II Design . Maximum resource utilization is again the primary ob-
jective. In the design of a particular facility this objective can be
achieved if the design is one which provides for future flexibility, and if
it is one which is achieved through proper utilization of the engineering
talent available in the Bureau's field engineering offices.
Considering the first point, it is apparent that decisions made
by the planner will largely govern the basis of facility design. This is
consistent with the fact that the designer participated in the planning
function through his collaboration with the maintenance engineer in the
selection of a type of construction that would best suit the requirement.
Although this predesign decision has been made, the designer must not allow
his imagination to become stagnant. Too often when c requirement comes up
for a particular facility—say a barracks building—the designer is inclined
to fall back on previous designs or on Bureau standard drawings and turn-
out, in an almost mechanical fashion, a carbon copy of his reference.
The designer must remember that neither the Kavy nor its require-
ments are static. What the architect considers as a barracks today may be-
come a training building 15 years hence. Changes such as these can be
economically accomplished if the original design is flexible. As an example,
in administrative facilities it would seem that thought could be given to
a modular layout that could be economically adapted to varying uses over
the years. Such a facility would be one with a lightweight exterior wall
and roof design, with a completely open interior, a raised floor with a
modular grid of electrical conduit beneath the floor, and provision for
light weight, easily moved, yet structurally sound, interior partitions.
In this respect, it is interesting to note that one corporation has even

uomitted the interior partitions in it3 main office building. Executives
working in the building cite the greatly improved communications resulting
from such a facility. The point to be made however, is that such facili-
ties are flexible; they recognize changing times; they recognize that plan-
ning is not infallible.
It is contended that the design of Navy facilities should incor-
porate these same general principles. Navy designs have been critized at
times for being too massive—for producing concrete mausoleums. In the past
the argument in rebuttal has always been the desire to minimize maintenance
costs through more permanent type construction; however, management's think-
ing is beginning to change. The Chief of the Bureau recently noted that
there will be times when monumental-type buildings will be needed for long-
term use; however, if the need is for a building to last five or ten years,
then this is what must be designed.1 jt is the writer's contention that the
discount method of analyzing lifetime costs will purposely focus attention
on facility life, but, more importantly, it will give a factual and realis-
tic basis for design.
No generalized conclusions can be drawn about the results which may
be expected from discount analysis. No one can say that 15-year construction
will always be the cheaper alternative, nor can this be said about the 25-
year type. It can be said, however, that whichever alternative is cheaper,
it will not become apparent through guesswork. It can also be said that
there is no justification for an undue obsession with maintenance costs.
The discount method does prove one thing; maintenance costs are not signifi-
cant to the investment decision unless they are very high in the immediate
^Address by Rear Admiral Peter Corradi, CEC, USN, Chief of the Bureau
of Yards and Dock3 to the Engineering Division Director's Conference held in
the Bureau, 9-13 July 1962.
-
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future (the more certain future), or unless the first costs of the two alter-
natives are very nearly the same. If designers can produce a 25-year low
maintenance product which has a first cost about equal to the 15-year alter-
native, then the taxpayers have received a real gain.
It is therefore proposed that there be a widespread trend toward
the flexible type of facility design, and toward the use of lighter building
materials. If this results in low cost 25-year facilities, so much the
better. On the other hand, if it means 15-year facilities with increased
maintenance costs, there should be no cause for alarm; costs that are pro-
jected very far into the future are discounted so heavily that they will
not influence total lifetime costs to any significant degree. It is the
total lifetime, including its present-worth assessment of costs and its
need for long-run flexibility, that should be uppermost in the designer's
mind.
The second aspect of facility design which will be analyzed is
the subject of the utilization of engineering personnel. Current practice
in the Bureau's field engineering offices is to use commercial architect-
engineer firms as design agencies under contract to the government. Engi-
neers in the field office design divisions are responsible for reviewing
the architect-engineer's work, and for handling the day-by-day technical
details related to the administration of the contract with the architect-
engineer. The use of architect-engineer firms has the advantage of provid-
ing an additional work force to handle peak loads; however, their widespread
use fails to maximize the available "in-house" engineering talent. The
Chief of the Bureau has recognized this fact and has stated,
"1-fy personal
conviction (is) that we must do more of our engineering design with our own
forces. This is easy to say, and vre have been saying it, perhaps too long.
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Now I want to get started doing it."! It is contended that the most effect-
ive way to get aueh a program started is to institute a policy of using at
least ^0% (workload permitting) of the engineers on tasks which involve
actual design.
This problem of engineering manpower utilization must not overlook
the need to approach any facility design situation with the objective of
achieving a well integrated design. Such a design is one which meets the
broad precepts laid down during planning, including the need for adherence
to the principles of long-run flexibility and attention to long-run costs.
The design, however, must not incorporate any features which would cause
construction or maintenance difficulties. These are familiar platitudes;
they would invoke everyone's agreement, but quicken no one's pulse. Yet it
is a fact that such designs are what must be achieved. Can these principles
be made more viable j can they become more meaningful through the purposeful
use of engineers as engineers; can they be realized more effectively through
improved management techniques? It is the writer's contention that these
objectives can be met, but what is needed is a fresh approach.
Such an approach must be one which looks at the objective and the
tools available for its achievement. The objective is maximum utilization
of resources—manpower, materials, r»nd money. Inherent in this goal are the
principles of design flexibility and integration. The tools available for
the achievement of these goals are the engineers in the field engineering
offices and the management of their efforts. Design divisions are now organ-
ized functionally, that is, by functional branches consisting of mechanical
engineers, civil engineers, electrical engineers, and so forth. Although




branches, it is apparent that considerable coordination must be achieved be-
tween them if the final facility design is to be free from errors. This
coordination is now being achieved j however, it is considered that too much
of the coordination comes the hard way, and when it is finally achieved in
one set of design plans, much of the same hard road must be traveled for the
next design. That the road to coordination is difficult is due to the fact
that engineers ar© organized by their individual functions, they are managed
by these same functions, and they are taught to think basically within these
same functional boundaries. Although experience will soften these bounda-
ries, and although some enginesrs are more easily able to grasp the overall
design perspective, engineering is nevertheless one field where it is all
too easy to become overly specialized.
Another factor which makes the road to coordination difficult is
the simple mundane aspect of physical separation. In a large engineering
organization the architects may be several hundred feet removed from the
electrical engineers. Human nature being what it is, the easiest way to
coordinate is to remove physical barriers and physical separation. Perhaps
this is why the corporation previously mentioned chose to put all management
from the president on down in one single room.
Considering each of these factors together with the recognized
objective of doing more design with "in-house" talent, it would seem that
the best way to approach the problem would be to reorganize those engineers
who will be doing actual design work into groups or teams made up of engi-
neers from each of the functional specialities, with each team headed by a
leader. Each team would then be assigned a specific type of facility, such
as administrative, personnel, industrial, and so forth, and would be respon-
sible for the complete and fully integrated design of the assigned facility
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type. It is contended that through such an approach it would be possible to
achieve physical coordination and integration. Furthermore, these engineers
will have the opportunity to perform as a professional teaii. This will not
only provide a means for integration, but it will also offer the opportunity
for developing an elite group of team leaders who should be the natural can-
didates for future design division directors.
To achieve full and complete integration, however, there is anoth-
er aspect which must be recognized. The benefits of complete organizational
integration and the achievement of fully integrated designs can come only
through the use of maintenance and construction engineers as engineering con-
sultants. They should be assigned as consultants to a particular engineering
team, and should participate in predesign conferences and in the periodic
review of the design plans and specifications with a view towards removing
any maintenance and construction problems before they arise in the field.
It must be recognized, however, that using maintenance and construction en-
gineers in this capacity is nothing new. It has been tried before, but its
success ha3 been questionable. It is contended that much of the problem lies
with those who directly manage these several groups of engineers. A. failing
of many professional men is their tendency toward professional jealousy.
Each guards his own specialty and resents an "outsiders" comments. It is
contended that the best way tc overcome these tendencies and to achieve maxi-
mum integration is for top management to purposely organize and utilize sub-
ordinates in such a May that they become members of closely integrated teams
with all members working towards a common team goal.
In line with the above factors, it is considered that facility
d23ign must be approached in a new and fresh manner in order to produce the
integrated and flexible designs that are needed to meet the needs of a
-
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General Inspector (which is by far the most prevalent grade and job title)
would indicate to the uninitiated that the holder of the job is capable of
conducting a 100$ thorough inspection of any and all phases of facility con-
struction. If nothing else, this would require intimate knowledge of not
only all the aspects of the particular contract plans and specifications,
but also of many, many federal and military standard specifications. Either
the inspector in question already has such knowledge or he must have the in-
centive to gain the knowledge. In the writer's opinion very few GS-7 in-
spectors have either qualities.
Thousands of words have been written on the subject of money and
motivation. Arguments concerning the effect of wages on employee motivation
range over the entire spectrum. It is not this writer's intention to enter
into the argument. Suffice it to say that personal experience indicates
that attempts to hire "the 11 inspector that everyone wants are not very success-
ful at a GS-7 grade level. Of course it is not possible just to simply pro-
mote all inspectors to the GS-9 level; furthermore, this would not solve all
the problems.
In addition to the problem involved with a basic lack of moti-
vation, there is also another significant factor involved in the use of GS-7
inspectors. Their abilities and qualities, or lack thereof, become as
readily apparent to the contractor as they do to the inspector's supervisors.
If a contractor is inclined to shave a few corners to save himself a dollar
or two, he can soon find the times and places to do it. In other words, an
inspector who cannot fully and completely represent the government is more
of a liability than not having an inspector at all. If an inspector,
through ignorance, allows a contractor to proceed with defective work, it
becomes awkward, at the least, to have the defective work torn out and re-

51
placed when (if ever) it is finally discovered.
To remedy these problems it is proposed that a system be insti-
tuted of reducing the number of GS-7 inspectors through normal attrition
and replacing them with a smaller number of GS-11 Construction Engineers.
It is considered that this will accomplish two things. It will put a prop-
erly motivated employee out on the job where it counts. This motivation
comes not only from remuneration, but also from an engineer's appreciation
for a job which conforms to plans and specifications because he has a
better understanding of the "why" behind the specifications. Secondly,
the government is being represented by a person who is better able to com-
mand the attention of the contractor.
It is recognized that such a policy could not be followed Navy-
wide. There will always be construction at remote locations where the
level of activity would not justify a full-time engineer. GS-7 inspection
of construction at such locations should, however, be supplemented by
periodic visits by construction engineers who would spend enough time at
the job site to conduct a thorough review of the work, and discuss all
discrepancies, no matter how minor, with the inspector.
It is to be noted that no hard and fast rule can be established
for how many GS-7 inspectors could be replaced by one GS-11 engineer; how-
ever, based on personal experience, it is considered that one well qualified
GS-11 engineer can do the work of four GS-7 general inspectors. Regardless
of the ratio, however, the point to be made is that more use should be made
of engineers who by their basic training and motivation are better quali-
fied to represent and protect the government's interests.
The second problem, involving contract change orders, can be
overcome to a major degree if the facility design is fully integrated.
Design errors or omissions can result in expensive construction contract
-
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change orders, and it is this reason which prompts the need for a construction
engineer review of the design plans and specifications before they are re-
leased for bidding. This review should also include an opportunity for the
construction engineer attached to the resident construction office to examine
the plans and specifications since he would be more familiar with conditions
at the work site which may lead to change orders. In fact, these engineers
should be consulted in the early stages of design in order to avoid last
minute design changes. Thus, this is another area where it is believed that
the services of an experienced field engineer would do much to insure the
successful completion of a well engineered and well constructed facility.
Concerning the final aspect, timely completion of construction,
it is well to spend a moment on why the need for timely completion and why
it is such a problem. If the facility being constructed is in direct sup-
port of a high priority weapon system, the need for timely completion of
construction is apparent. Such is not always the case, however, when the
facility is an administration building, a barracks, a chapel, or any of the
many general purpose facilities. If this is the case, why the concern?
The concern is the fact that, as constructors, the Bureau's field engineer-
ing offices and the subordinate resident construction offices have an ob-
ligation to deliver to the customer the facility when it was promised. Even
though the item in question may not be a high priority missile assembly
building there has nevertheless been a considerable number of manhours that
have gone into justifying the project as an urgent requirement, and a con-
siderable amount of local station planning that has gone into scheduling
the moving into the facility as well as other related details. These may
seem to be minor points and perhaps they are—to everyone, that is, except
the prospective user of the facility.
-
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If it can be argued that customer satisfaction is an underlying
motive in any organization (and it certainly must be in a service organization
such as the Bureau), then these points are more than just minor. Unfortunate-
ly customer satisfaction is all too easy to overlook in the day-to-day prob-
lems of management. This is perhaps more the case in a bureaucratic organi-
zation where customer satisfaction cannot be so readily equated with
organizational success. It cannot be denied, however, that this satisfaction
is a significant factor in Bureau management, and it therefore seems logical
to state that the Bureau should take all reasonable measures to insure that
facilities are completed within the time allowed by the construction contract.
The reason why the time element is so difficult to enforce is
not due to the type of contract nor due to the type of contract administra-
tion. The standard Navy construction contract provides for time extensions
due to unforeseen conditions, government delays, or acts of God. In any of
these general instances it certainly cannot be denied that the contractor is
entitled to a time extension. Neither can contract administration be
entirely blamed for the difficulty, although some people, including the
writer, long felt this was the case. There would be times when it was ap-
parent that the work was behind schedule, but regardless of the number of
conferences with the contractor little action would be taken. This was so
simply because the contractor knew that rarely is any contract completed with-
out a change order. Once a change order was issued, the contractor knew he
would have a solid legal basis for requesting a time extension with enough
extra time "buried" in his request to account for his past slowness. Despite
recommendations to the contrary, in almost every case the authorities respon-




In reviewing past experience, it is apparent that the difficul-
ty was not due to the type of contract nor to the contract administration,
but rather to the fact that rarely was there any means available for the
direct measurement of exactly how much a specific change order or government
action affected the overall contract completion. It was felt that better
prejob planning on the government's part would help to overcome the diffi-
culty. Considerable precontract effort was spent therefore in reviewing
the circumstances surrounding the job to determine how the government could
assist the contractor to complete the work on schedule. One overriding
factor, however, always presented a problem. The government is not in
business to tell a contractor how to manage his workj consequently, any
improvement which would arise from these efforts depended strictly on the
contractor's willingness to cooperate. Even though this willingness was
present, it still did not solve the basic issue because a change order
would automatically negate all previous benefits which the government may
have gained from attempts to cajole the contractor into keeping on schedule.
As soon as a change order was issued, the contractor would include enough
days in his time request to make up for the past delays he may have had.
Government attempts to eliminate the "extra" days, although sometimes
successful, were not always so because of the difficulty of assessing the
exact effect of the particular change order on the overall job and its
many parts. Thus again the issue reduces to one of being able to measure
time delays.
Problems such as those described above need exist no longer.
Management techniques such as the Program Evaluation and Eeview Technique
(PERT) or the Critical Path Method (CPM) now make it possible to schedule
a complex job including all of the many related procurement and review
.
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actions, and to mathematically determine the particular series of job
events which constitute the so-called critical path. These job events are
those whose delay would delay completion of the entire job. The benefit to
be gained from this method of job scheduling is that it becomes possible to
assess any change order or any other factor which may have an inherent delay
factor and determine whether or not this delay will effect the overall job.
Estimated Start Finish Float Critical





1 5 8 5
2 15 15 15 N
3 12 5 13 17 25 8 8
I 6 5 15 11 21 10
5 4 11 21 15 25 10 10
6 10 15 15 25 25 *
7 9 25 25 34 34 *
Figure No. U . Critical Path Network
This can be demonstrated by the simple Critical Path Method
example shown in Figure No. A above. This job can be divided into seven
tasks whose interrelationships are shown in the network. The contractor who
will perform these tasks arrives at an estimate of how much time will be
required for each individual operation such as five days for operation one
and 15 days for operation two. From this information the earliest start
'
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and finish times may be determined for each operation. For example, opera-
tion one must start at the time of contract award, and it requires five days
to complete, thus its earliest finish time is five days. On the other hand,
operation four cannot start until operation one is completed. The earliest
operation four can start is the same as the earliest time which operation
one can finish. The six days which operation four requires results in an
earliest finish time for operation four of 11 days. The same type of ana-
lysis can be applied in reverse to determine the latest finish and start
times. For example, the latest that operation seven can finish is 3A, days.
Since it requires nine days to complete this operation, its latest start
time is on the 25th day.
The next operation, determining float times, is most important
because it forms the basis for future actions and decisions. Total float
is a measure of the amount of leeway in a particular operation. Within
this amount of time, an operation may take longer to perform than estimated,
or may start at a date later than its earliest start date without effecting
the overall job. For instance, operation four can be delayed 10 days with-
out effecting the total job completion; however, operation two cannot be
delayed even one day without delaying the entire project. Free float is
another measure of operational leewayj it is the difference between the
earliest finish date of the particular operation and the earliest start dates
of directly following operations. Free float indicates the leeway within
which any variation effects neither the total job nor following operations.
For instance, operation three can be delayed up to eight days without effect-
ing anything else.
Examination of Figure No. U will reveal that operations two, six,
and seven have zero total float. These are the operations which are critical
I
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and two-six-seven becomes the critical path, the path along which no delay
can be tolerated. Whatever delay does occur along this path extends the
total job completion by the same amount. From this example it is also ap-
parent that a change order involving operation three would not be the cause
for any time extension to the contract unless the delay were greater than
eight days. Could there be a better means of arbitrating contract time
extensions?
It is therefore proposed that construction contracts (at least
those exceeding $500,000) have this feature incorporated into the contract
terms by requiring the contractor to submit with his bid a Critical Path
Method network, with the understanding that the contractor's network would
be used for the determination of all time extensions regardless of the
cause. Not only will this procedure improve an important aspect of govern-
mental contract administration, but it will also provide a positive basis
for keeping the prospective using agency informed of construction progress
and the expected date when the facility will be available for use.
The foregoing procedures, use of construction engineers and use
of the Critical Path Method of controlling time extensions, will help achieve
the overall system objective of maximizing resource utilization. This will
com© about through the effective use of engineers to achieve the quality of
construction which the government has paid for, and through an effective
means of achieving timely support of urgent facility requirements through-
out the Navy,
IV. Maintenance . In a great many respects maintenance is the
key to the integrated management system since it provides much of the
essential feedback in the system. Previous discussion of the discount
method of analyzing investment situations demonstrated one essential fact
.
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concerning maintenance; it is significant to projected lifetime costs but,
generally, only in the near future. This, however, should not be thought
of as an excuse for talcing maintenance management lightly. To the contrary,
it lends even greater emphasis to the need for effective management since
the entire basis of discount analysis and of more economical first cost is
the fact that somewhat higher maintenance costs may be expected. The sig-
nificance of this point is that even better maintenance management is needed.
This must be achieved through a system which seeks to minimize maintenance
costs.
There are two other significant factors concerning the relation-
ship of maintenance to discount analysis. One of the essential elements in
this method of analysis is to account for uncertainty, and a major factor
in this regard is the matter of future maintenance costs. If their un-
certainty could be removed, it would be possible to use a lower discount
rate which in turn may mean the final selection of a different course of
action. For instance, in the previous example of the two wharfs, if the
total discount could be lowered to L$ (3% for return and 1% for risk) the
lifetime cost for Alternative No. 1 would be $1,860,000 and for Alternative
No. 2, |1,620,000, as compared to the 6% discounted costs of $1,570,000 and
f1,272,000 respectively. Although the second alternative is still the
better choice, it is apparent that the difference between the two has de-
creased by about | 60,000 through a decrease in the discount rate. If the
investment situation had been one in which the first costs of the two alter-
natives were more nearly equal, the lower discount rate could have meant the
25-year alternative would be the better choice. Thus by removing uncertain-
ty from the situation, it may be possible in sone instances to have more
permanent construction at essentially the same lifetime cost.
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The second important relationship between maintenance and dis-
count analysis is the fact that if it were possible to establish acceptable
levels of maintenance, within which continued use of the facility would be
economically justified, it would then be possible to say that whenever
maintenance costs consistentaly exceeded the acceptable level, the facility
should be either repaired or replaced. In fact, it should eventually be
possible to predict these requirements by analyzing the trends of actual
costs as compared to standard.
Considering the above points (better maintenance management, the
need to reduce uncertainty, and the need to be able to predict requirements)
it becomes apparent that what is required is a system of maintenance stand-
ards or norms which will indicate the acceptable level of maintenance for a
particular type of facility at a particular point in time. As previously
discussed in Chapter III the Bureau currently has underway a program for the
establishment of such norms, although the objective has been to develop a
means of forecasting budget requirements. It is now apparent, however, that
such standards will have applications other than budgeting.
There are two significant points concerning the establishment of
maintenance standards which warrant further consideration. For standards to
be of any value they must recognize the fact that facility age and specific
type of construction are variables which simply cannot be overlooked. This
is true regardless of the initial effort it takes to accumulate data along
these lines. To assume that maintenance requirements or levels i-/ill be the
same after 20 years of usage is trying to oversimplify the problem to the
point where the results will be meaningless. It is likewise a gross over-
simplification to attempt to establish norms without recognizing the fact
that different building materials have varying maintenance requirements.
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Such requirements, however, cannot be recognized through the accumulation of
data by the broad catagories of permanent and nonpeiruanent construction.
This is not to say that the Bureau is unaware of these fact3. To the con-
trary, as previously stated, personnel involved in these studies recognize
the many variables involved as well as the need tc collect the additional
data necessary to account for all such items.
As also previously stated, the current problem which the Bureau
faces in its task of establishing maintenance standards is the method of
data collection which is necessary to establish standards. Attempts to
collect detailed data were thwarted by the feval Comptroller's decision
that such detailed data collection imposed an excessive workload on field
activities. It is interesting to note at the same time that this workload
did not include the accumulation or information which accounted for the
essential factors of facility age anc specific type of construction; thus
data collection is required in even greater detail than before. Recognizing
these facts it would appear that perhaps another approach to the problem
is necessary. Such an approach must be one which is compatible with reason-
able economic and physical constraints. A proposed method, which it is be-
lieved will meet the various requirements, is outlined as follows:
A. An essential prerequisite to the establishment of standards
is to define the parameters within which such a system of standards will op-
erate. These parameters must deal with specific types of facility construc-
tion, facility age, and maintenance areas within which standards will be set.
The first item which deals with specific types of construction involves major
considerations and more than almost casual mention i3 beyond the scope of
this paper. It is, however, apparent that for buildings one must consider
specific types of structural framing and the various types of interior and
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exterior materials. Similiar considerations would be necessary for other
types of facilities. Relative to the age factor, it would seem logical to
assume that maintenance levels could be established which would be applica-
ble to a particular time range. For example, maintenance requirements could
be thought of as being essentially constant within any particular range such
as 0-2 years, 3-5 years, 5-10 years and so forth. This of course would be
subject to verification. Relative to the final item, which concerns itself
with the maintenance areas in which standards should be set, it would seem
that perhaps the task of setting standards could be better accomplished if
it were approached in a more incremental fashion. Perhaps such an approach
would consist of surveying the larger Naval activities to determine major
types of workloads by work centers. These data could then be used as start-
ing points for standard setting, since it would seem that the areas in which
the most money is being spent are those which should first be brought under
control.
B. After these parameters have been defined, data collection
should be undertaken at selected activities which are large enough to encom-
pass a representative sample of facility types, construction types, and age
groups in those areas where standards would first be set. Public Works Cen-
ters and the larger Naval activities would seem to offer an ideal choice.
Data collection should proceed on the basis of 100# inspection and evaluation,
and should seek to determine not only what the level of maintenance has been
within budget limitations, but also what the levels should be. The data col-
lection should be undertaken by selected teams of experienced maintenance
engineers and inspectors who would be able to reach sound conclusions, since
considerable judgment would be involved. It is noted that a significant ad-
vantage of this method of data collection is that the entire operation
would be under Bureau control rather than being conducted on a Navy- wide
I
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basis which is difficult to control and administer.
C. The data collected from the survey of Public Works Cen-
ters would require considerable analysis and correlation prior to the publi-
cation of even tentative standards since it would be necessary to determine
significant variances between activities, and calculate appropriate weighting
factors. Included in this analysis should be the consideration of estab-
lishing minljmim cost standards. For example, in areas of routine maintenance,
such as the interior painting of buildings, the objective is to iainiiize
total costs. In this respect there are two alternatives to be considered,
namely, to repaint the entire interior of the building at one time, or to
repaint individual areas on an as needed basis. The costs to be minimized
are: (l) the cost of repainting individual areas of the building according
to their varying usage factors, (2) the cost of repainting the interior of
the entire facility on a regularly scheduled basis, (3) the value of old
paint life wasted when covered during routine scheduled maintenance, and
(4) fixed costs. It is apparent that many variables exist in even such a
simple example; however, for facilities such as administrative buildings, it
is considered that from the previous survey of Public Works Centers and
major Naval activities, standards could be determined for the scheduled re-
painting of public areas and office areas. For example, it may be determined
that public areas should be repainted every three years and office areas
every five years. From the plans of several typical administration buildings,
an average ratio of public areas to administrative areas could be determined.
From this information it would appear that analysis would reveal which of
the two alternative methods of repainting the interiors of administrative
facilities produces the lover long-run cost over the life of the facility.
Similiar analyses could be conducted in other areas where repetitive type
•
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maintenance is experienced; i.e., servicing unit heaters, replacing light
bulbs, and so forth. It is considered that guidelines for studies such as
these could be provided by the Bureau to the field engineering offices who
would prepare analyses for individual Naval activities under their juris-
diction.
D. Eased on the data collected during the previously
mentioned surveys, and their subsequent analysis, it is considered that
tentative standards could be established for use at selected pilot instal-
lations. Results of the pilot installation studies would permit further
review and analysis of the standards and the data collection system neces-
sary to support their use on a Navy-wide basis.
From the preceding discussion it is obvious that maintenance
standards cannot be set overnight. It is also apparent that establishing
standards may have to be done on a painstaking basis; however, it is con-
sidered that the task can be accomplished if the areas where standards
should be set are defined, a plan is drawn up, and milestones established.
It is necessary, however, to collect and analyze data in far greater detail
than is now being done. Furthermore, the problem of detailed Navy-wide data
collection will come up again when performance measurement against the
standards becomes effective; however, if the standards are established, and
their use demonstrated at selected pilot installations it should be easier
to gain top management endorsement. In this respect, as with most manage-
ment controls, the use of maintenance standards will have to be sold to top
management.
This sales job should not be too difficult once standards are
established, because their availability would put a real measure of control
in the expenditure of maintenance dollars, and would also offer an intelligent

basis for budgeting. Of equal significance is the fact that the availabil-
ity of standards which are directly related to facility age and to specific
types of construction materials would provide a meaningful basis for pre-
dicting the need for major repair or replacement funding as well as a basis
for the evaluation of different building materials. In addition, there
would be a means of predicting the long-run cost of various types of con-
struction with a greater degree of certainty. This could possibly be the
means for demonstrating the true economic advantage of more permanent-type
construction (which has lower maintenance costs) through the use of lower
discount rates. It would seem that there is much to be gained from the
effort.
V. Budgeting. It is readily apparent that the availability of
maintenance standards would provide a means whereby the Bureau could furnish
considerable assistance to management bureaus in the formulation of annual
budget requests since it would be possible to directly relate standard
maintenance requirements to required funding levels. Another and even more
significant point is the fact that the only time the budget commands any
attention is once each year when the time comes to prepare the budget request
for the following fiscal year. It is worthy to note that if maintenance
standards were used in the formulation of the budget, then the budget itself
would become a master standard against which the entire Public Works Depart-
ment could be measured. It is thus considered that the relationship between
maintenance standards and budgeting is more than just a means of budget for-
mulation. Standards would also provide an objective means for the appraisal
of efficient performance, thus making the budget a tool for performance





ie foregoing general analysis of the Bureau's major manage-
: functions, it is possible to summarise the concept of the integrated
management s here is a logical and essential horizontal flow of in-
formation between the various Bureau functions. From planning cooes the
economic data upon which investment decisions are made. These decisions,
however, are influenced by feedback from the design function relative to
first cost of various facility types and from the maintenance function
relative to projectei maintenance costs. The final investment decision
then become 3 the framework for facility design which, in turn, must incor-
porate maximum flexibility and feedback from maintenance and construction.
Maintenance and construction feedback is accomplished through the efforts
of maintenance and construction engineer consultants to the design team of
Lneers; the purpose of the feedback to design is to benefit from pre-
vious maintenance and construction experience and avoid repeating the same
mistakes twice. Final design plans and specifications become the basis
for facility construction. Completed construction i3, of course, the
source of a physical addition to the activity's plant account as well as
a source of "as-built H construction plans which are necessary to future
maintenance and repair. Maintenance becomes the final element in the closed
loop, 3ince maintenance activities, which are based on the use of standard
maintenance factors, become the source of budget, planning, and design in-
formation. In addition to these information flows, there is an element of
feedback to maintenance which may be identified as budgetary control meas-
ures.
There is also an essential vertical flow of information between
the various Bureau levels. At each Naval activity, the Public Works Officer
will use the budget and maintenance standards together with labor, material,
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and expenditure analyses as means of measuring and controlling efficiency,
planning workload and manpower schedules, and planning future budget re-
quirements. The Bureau's field engineering offices will employ maintenance
cost data from the various activities in the economic analysis of new con-
struction and repair-replacement alternatives. These same data will also
serve a3 a means for continued technical assistance by the field engineer-
ing office to the activity Public Works Officer. From the computer instal-
lation at Port Hueneme, the flow of data to the Bureau will be much the
same as now being furnished sxcopt that after maintenance standards are
established, the cost reports should be modified to indicate exceptions to
standards. 1 Summaries of detailed maintenance data received by the Bureau
would be the basis for review of standards as well as a means of reporting
on Bureau performance to higher authorities. In addition to public works
cost data, the Bureau should also be furnished summaries of alternative
economic cost analyses which have been completed by the field engineering
offices. These data would serve as the basis for a Bureau prepared summary
of Mavy-wide alternative cost studies for use by Kavy management in deter-
mining program requirements.
Little has been said in this chapter concerning the use of computers
in the Bureau's management. This has been done so with a purpose because
in the final analysis a computer is only a mechanised tool for processing
data. The heart of the system lies in the analysis of management informa-
tion requirements. It is, however, apparent that computers afford the
ability for improved data collection and processing. Mechanization of the
Bureau's information systems beyond that already in effect would require
Relative to public works cost reporting it would appear that reports
required by NAVDOCKS F-321 and HAVDOCKS P-3A4 could be consolidate!.
'
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further analysis; however, it would seem that the present degree of infor-
mation automation is satisfactory until such time as wide scale use of




The foregoing discussion has been aimed at reviewing the general out-
line and concept of a management system which, it is believed, would be
responsive to the changing needs of the Navy and of the Bureau of Yards
and Docks. The objective of the proposed system is the maximum utilization
of resources. It is felt that this objective represents a tangible goal
for all management levels.
Although it can be argued that current Bureau management has the
same objective, it is this writer's opinion that such a goal can never be
completely attained without a fully integrated approach to management.
Day-by-day management of a public works department maintenance program is
important; however, this activity is no less essential than other facets
of Bureau management. The time is past for designers to be worried only
about design problems and construction engineers to be worried only about
their problems. It is recognized that this tendency is perhaps most pro-
nounced at the middle management level where it is all too easy to become
so preoccupied with today's problems and decisions that other and perhaps
broader aspects of management are overlooked. It is therefore believed
that what is needed is a management system which purposely orients all
levels of the organization towards a coaanon goal. If the merits of such





As in many cases, vhere there is a will there is a way. With top
management's blessing and a feasible plan to work from, an integrated system
can be instituted. Integral parts of the plan would be greater Bureau
participation in shore facilities planning, a positive trend toward the
development of an approach to design which would be based on lowest life-
time cost, improved control over the quality and timely completion of
facility construction, the institution of standardized maintenance pro-
cedures, and the purposeful use of the maintenance budget as a control
measure. Each of these elements is an important portion of the integrated
management concept; however, caution should be exercised lest any one of
these items become the sole aim of the program.
It is considered that there are many benefits to be gained from an
integrated approach to the management of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
For many years Navy management has attempted to obtain additional military
construction funding since it has realized that after facility requirements,
which support top priority programs, have been accounted for, precious
little of the military construction program ceiling was left for less
urgent items such as barracks, utility replacements, chapels, and other
similiar projects which are of major importance to the Navy, yet cannot
take precedence over POLARIS and other high priority programs. In the
light of this situation it would seem that a system for objectively ana-
lyzing alternative costs would be beneficial in stretching the dollar
further.
The dollar to be stretched is also the one of tomorrow. Facility
design must recognize this Isy providing a facility which is flexible and
can be economically adapted to tomorrow's needs. The design ei'iort, how-
ever, must be undertaken in such a way that the taxpayers reap the maximum
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gain from personnel who are on the government payroll. The benefits of the
system also extend into the areas of construction and maintenance. Greater
assurance of a fair return on the taxpayer's dollar is realized through im-
proved means of obtaining the quality of construction prescribed by the con-
tract as well as a significant means of controlling the time limits within
which the facility construction will be completed. Maintenance, in turn,
is furnished with a means for obtaining better control over efficiency and
effectiveness through the use of standards. The budget becomes a mechanism
for overall public works cost, performance, and efficiency control at the
local activity level.
In essence, it is considered that although each element offers ad-
vantages, the only way to achieve the maximum benefit of the proposed sys-
tem is to realize the existence of the very vital and meaningful relation-
ships between the various functions and to capitalize on them. In short,
the entire effort must be toward maximum resource utilization through a
fully integrated approach to all of the Bureau's management functions.
As a final word, it would appear that the Eureau would do well to
put all possible emphasis on its integrated management studies. With the
amount of expressed interest in the various facets of military management
of facilities, it would appear to be only a matter of time before new tech-
niques of requirements analysis and performance evaluation are devised.
I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Man's;
I will not Reason and Compare j my business is to Create.
-William Blake (1757-1S27)1
lj. M. and M. J. Cohen, Tlie Penguin Dictionary of Quotations (New
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By means of interest calculations it is possible to determine an
amount of money at any given time which is equivalent to a stated amount of
money at some other time. For example, if an interest rate of 5% per annum
is used, $1.00 now and $1.05 a year from now may be said to be equivalent to
each other. Discount analysis is a specific method of using interest calcu-
lations to determine a single amount of money which is equivalent to a series
of annual cash payments, and that is added to the first cost of an asset, so
as to give a single amount that is equivalent to both first cost and annual
cash disbursements.
Discounting utilizes two interest factors, the Single Payment Present
Worth Factor and the Uniform Payment Series Present Worth Factor as follows:
!• Single Payment Present Worth Factor .
Given S, find P using the factor J,
(l+i)n
This factor, when multiplied by a future amount, will give the present worth
of the future amount. For example, at 6% interest a businessman could af-
ford to make a payment of $233 now to avoid making a payment of $1,000 25
years from now.
II. Uniform Payment Series Present Worth Factor .





This factor, when multiplied by one of a series of equal end-of-period pay-
ments, gives the present worth at the beginning of the period. For example,
at 6% a businessman could afford to make a single payment of $7,360 now to
avoid making a payment of $1,000 at the end of each year for the next 10
years. In the foregoing formulae:
i=interest rate per interest period.
n-number of interest periods.
P=present sum of money.
H^a single end-of-period payment in a series of n equal
payments made at uniform intervals, the entire series
being equivalent to P.
S=a sum of money n periods hence, which is equivalent to
either P or P at interest rate i.
Dse of the discount method also makes it possible to find the present
worth of a series of payments that take place between any two time periods.
For example, to find the present worth of $2,000 annual payments that take
place from years 11 to 15 inclusive, it is necessary to multiply the amount
of one payment by the Uniform Payment Series Present Worth Factor for n=5,
that is, for years 11 to 15. This will give the "present" worth of the pay-
ment series at the beginning of the series; i.e., at year 10. This value
must then be multiplied by the Single Payment Present Worth Factor for n=10
to find the actual present worth of the uniform payment series. Thus the
present worth of the |2,000 uniform payment series at 6% is $2,000 (A, 212)
(.3584.) £4,707. (W. G. Ireson and E. L. Grant (eds.), Handbook of Industrial
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